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AN OBSCURED EXPANSION OF 

THE COMMERCE POWER 

JASON WOJCIECHOWSKI* 
INTRODUCTION 
The so-called "federalism revolution" of the Rehnquist Su­
preme Court! struck fear in the hearts of some scholars. They wor­
ried that long-standing federal antidiscrimination laws, such as Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),2 might be held un­
constitutional because of the revolution's new levels of judicial 
scrutiny of Congress's attempts to exercise its legislative power,3 
* JD candidate, 2008, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (Yeshiva University). 
Thanks to Professors Michelle Adams, Margaret Lemos, and Julie Suk, as well as 
Austen Rachlis, for their guidance and comments. 
1. The phrase "federalism revolution" refers to the perceived program of the Su­
preme Court under Chief Justice William Rehnquist to place limitations on the exercise 
of federal power, particularly federal legislative power. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 
1051 (2001) ("[Bush v. Gore] occurred against the background of a veritable revolution 
in constitutional doctrine that has been going on for some fifteen years. "); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1 (2004); Larry D. Kramer, 
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 138 (2001) ("The real revolution began 
in 1995, when for the first time in six decades the Court struck down a federal statute as 
exceeding the limits of the Commerce Clause."). But see Keith E. Whittington, Taking 
What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477,477 
(2001) (describing the "recent federalism cases" as "not quite amounting to a 
revolution "). 
2. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e (2000). 
3. See Paul Boudreaux, Federalism and the Contrivances of Public Law, 77 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 523, 566-70 (2003) (discussing the Rehnquist Court's likely approach to 
the question of Title VII's constitutionality and concluding that overturning the statute 
"would be a logical result of the ... Court's new federalism"); Sylvia A. Law, In the 
Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 
U. CiN. L. REV. 367, 385 (2002) ("[T]he Court's decision in Garrett strongly suggests 
that federal legislative protection of civil rights and liberties will no longer be tolerated 
by the Supreme Court majority."); James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: 
How the New Federalism May Affect the Anti-Discrimination Mandate of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 91 (2000); James M. Oleske, Jr., Federalism, Free 
Exercise, and Title VII: Reconsidering Reasonable Accommodation, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 525, 526 (2004) ("Could Title VII be the next victim of the states' rights revolu­
tion?"); Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE LJ. 1141,1143­
44 (2002) (arguing that federalism concerns were merely a "stalking-horse" for the 
Court's actions against the national antidiscrimination program); Louis J. Virelli III & 
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particularly under the Commerce Clause.4 Because Title VII's en­
actment was at least partially based on the Commerce Clause,5 the 
Court's willingness to scale back Congress's ability to regulate pur­
suant to its commerce power created this anxiety of judicial cancel­
lation of the national antidiscrimination scheme.6 The Supreme 
Court cases of United States v. Lopez7 and United States v. Morri­
son8 are the main sources of this concern. Both cases struck down 
congressional action as transcending the boundaries of the Com­
merce Clause. Morrison is particularly worrisome for those favor­
ing broad congressional authority in the antidiscrimination realm 
because the statute at issue concerned gender-motivated violence. 
More recently, the Court decided Raich v. Gonzalez,9 which held 
that a statute regulating, inter alia, intrastate growth of marijuana 
was a proper exercise of the commerce power.10 These potentially 
David S. Leibowitz, "Federalism Whether They Want It or Not": The New Commerce 
Clause Doctrine and the Future ofFederal Civil Rights Legislation After United States v. 
Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926, 926 (2001) ("[T]he interpretive preferences of the 
Morrison Court squarely threaten future congressional attempts to address civil rights 
violations, as they have proven unable to provide principled and intelligible judicial 
standards for Congress to follow in drafting such legislation."); see also Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rational Dis­
crimination, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923, 944 (2004) (noting the possibility that the Court 
might be "beginning a general retreat from the prohibition of rational discrimination it 
previously staked out"). 
4. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power "[t]o regulate 
Commerce ... among the several States"); see also Kramer, supra note 1, at 1376 
("[T]he Rehnquist Court has repudiated the New Deal's judicial presumption of consti­
tutionality and restored heightened scrutiny [of Congress's exercise of Article I pow­
ers]."); infra Part I.B (discussing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)). 
5. The other source of power relied upon by Congress in enacting Title VII was 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 367 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Title VII 
was enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and [Section] 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also infra Part I.C (describing limitations on the 
power of Congress to enact legislation using Section 5 and reconciling the statement in 
Bakke with the current Section 5 jurisprudence). 
6. Because of their similar structure and purported constitutional bases, statutes 
cast into doubt alongside Title VII include the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.c. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2000); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.c. 
§§ 621-634 (2000); and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. See 
infra note 22 (discussing the structural similarities between the federal antidiscrimina­
tion statutes). 
7. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. 
8. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. Lopez and Morrison are discussed in more depth in­
fra Part LB. 
9. Raich v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
10. Id. at 12-33. 
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contradictory rulings have generated confusion as to the scope of 
Congress's commerce power. 
While Title VII may not actually be in danger, any hint from 
the Court regarding the scope of Congress's commerce power re­
mains welcome, particularly in light of the confusion raised by 
Raich. The recent case of Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.11 appears on 
the surface to have scant relevance to these federalism concerns. 
While the case involved Title VII, neither party challenged the con­
stitutionality of the statute. Rather, the question before the Court 
was whether the requirement that an employer have fifteen or more 
employees in order to be governed by the statute describes a limita­
tion on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courtS.12 The 
11. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
12. Id. at 503 ("The question ... is whether the numerical qualification contained 
in Title VII's definition of 'employer' affects federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction 
...."). The other alternative is that the fifteen-employee requirement is an element of 
the plaintiff's cause of action. Id. (describing the other possible classification of the 
"numerical qualification" as "delineat[ing] a substantive ingredient of a Title VII claim 
for relief"). 
The distinction at stake in Arbaugh between a jurisdiction- or claim-oriented inter­
pretation has a variety of consequences. Even beyond putting aside the constitutional 
impact argued by this Article, these consequences make it important that courts have a 
clear idea of whether they are dealing with a jurisdiction or merit issue. 
First, if an element is part of the plaintiff's cause of action, and not a matter of 
subject-matter jurisdiction, then the defendant might waive the right to raise a failure to 
satisfy that element. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h). In the Title VII context, this means that 
an employer with fewer than fifteen employees who does not raise that issue in a timely 
manner may be deemed to have waived the right to do so. Because the Supreme Court 
in Arbaugh held that the employee-numerosity requirement is, in fact, a part of the 
plaintiff's cause of action, Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516, the defendant employer's failure to 
make a motion for dismissal on the grounds that it did not have fifteen employees 
before judgment had been rendered precluded its ability to do so at all. Thus, the judg­
ment against it, pursuant to Title VII, will stand despite the fact that it does not actually 
fall within the regulatory confines of that statute. 
While the waiver issue seems likely to come up only in this context, it is conceiva­
ble that an employer might intentionally waive a defense that it had fewer than fifteen 
employees in order to stay in federal court if it had a reasonable certainty of prevailing 
on the merits in that court. A situation where this could arise is where an employee 
brings not only a Title VII action, but also supplemental claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367 
(2000) (granting the federal courts "supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that 
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part 
of the same case or controversy"), based on state antidiscrimination law, where the 
state law defines "employer" less restrictively than Title VII. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW 
§ 292(5) (McKinney 2006) ("The term 'employer' does not include any employer with 
fewer than four persons in his employ." (emphasis added)). If the employer in such 
situation feels confident that it will prevail on the merits of these claims in federal court 
but will lose on the merits of the state law claim in state court, then it may prefer to 
avoid having the Title VII claim dismissed and, instead, remain mum about its number 
of employees. 
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Court answered that question in the negative,B eliminating a split 
among the circuitsI4 and putting to rest a non-earth-shattering, but 
nonetheless important, question.15 Part I of this Article sets out 
these background materials. First, the employee-numerosity re­
quirement and jurisdictional element of Title VII are described and 
their relation to Arbaugh is elucidated. Next, the Supreme Court's 
recent Commerce Clause cases are explored in some depth. Fi­
nally, this Part discusses the line of cases establishing that Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment (Section 5) does not give Congress 
the power to regulate private activity. 
This Article will argue in Parts II and III that Arbaugh can be 
read as standing for more than a simple clarification of the scope of 
federal court jurisdiction with respect to Title VII. Instead, 
Second, if an element goes to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
then those courts have a duty to raise the issue sua sponte if it appears that the element 
might not be satisfied. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of 
the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court 
shall dismiss the action."). In the above situation, then, where the employer with less 
than fifteen employees wants to remain in federal court, and if the employee-numer­
osity requirement was jurisdictional, the judge could dismiss the case on her own initia­
tive. Because of Arbaugh, however, this is not the case. The judge would be forced to 
let the case remain in her courtroom unless the defendant made a motion to dismiss. 
Finally, the same illustration also shows the impact on supplemental jurisdiction. If 
a plaintiff brings state law claims in federal court pursuant to the federal courts' supple­
mental jurisdiction and the federal claims are dismissed, the outcome with regard to the 
state claims is partially determined by the manner in which the federal claims were 
dismissed. If the federal claims were dismissed for lack of subject -matter jurisdiction, 
then the court has no authority to hear the state law claims. See 28 U.S.c. § 1367(a). 
The district courts are permitted to exercise supplemental jurisdiction "over all other 
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that 
they form part of the same case or controversy." Id. Thus, if there is no claim in the 
action over which the district court has original jurisdiction, no supplemental jurisdic­
tion can be exercised. If, however, the federal claims were dismissed on the merits, 
then the court is permitted to exercise its discretion as to whether it should retain the 
remaining state law claims. See id. § 1367(c)(3) ("The district courts may decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [supplemental] claim ... if the district court 
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction ...." (emphasis added». 
13. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 504 ("[T]he employee-numerosity requirement relates 
to the substantive adequacy of [the plaintiff's] Title VII claim ...."). 
14. See Jeffrey A. Mandell, Comment, The Procedural Posture of Minimum Em­
ployee Thresholds in Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1049­
54 (2005) (describing the circuit split on this issue). The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Ninth Circuits all held the employee-numerosity requirement to limit the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts. Id. at 1050. The Third and Seventh Circuits held the requirement to 
go to the merits of the plaintiff's case. Id. at 1050-52. Finally, the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits use a "hybrid" approach. Id. at 1052-53. However, this approach turns out in 
the end to really be a disguised "merits" approach. Id. at 1053-54. 
15. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 514-16 (describing some of the consequences of label­
ing a restricting element as "jurisdictional" or "merits"). 
2008] AN OBSCURED EXPANSION OF THE COMMERCE POWER 481 

Arbaugh is consistent with the Court's suggestion in Raich that the 
federalism revolution did not take away as much of Congress's 
power as may have been believed after Lopez and Morrison. Fur­
ther, an examination of all of the consequences of Arbaugh's rule 
reveals that it is more than merely consistent with Raich; rather, it 
demonstrates that Congress has power under the Commerce Clause 
to regulate any activity that it can reasonably construe as economic, 
even though that power was seemingly restricted by Lopez and 
Morrison. This reading of Arbaugh is driven by the connection be­
tween the federal courts' jurisdiction to hear a case and Congress's 
power to grant such jurisdiction. That is, in order for federal courts 
to have legitimate subject-matter jurisdiction over a federal statu­
tory cause of action, Congress must have the constitutional power 
to create that cause of action,16 Part IV goes on to explore what 
this argument means for our understanding of the balance of power 
between Congress and the Supreme Court, concluding that Con­
gress may have broader commerce power than previously thought. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Arbaugh and Title VII 
Arbaugh involved a Title VII claim against a private em­
ployerP Title VII bars discrimination by employers on the basis of 
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."18 The employee was 
a waitress and bartender at a small New Orleans restaurant who 
alleged that her employer sexually harassed her, which led to her 
constructive discharge.19 While the issue did not arise at first, the 
small size of the defendant restaurant would later become the key 
point in the case because Title VII does not cover every employer 
in the country. Rather, to be subject to the statute, an employer 
must meet the statutory definition of "employer." That definition 
contains two restrictions that are relevant here: the "employee­
numerosity requirement" and the "jurisdictional element. "20 The 
16. This connection is fleshed out and justified infra Part II. 
17. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503-04. 
18. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
19. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 507. As to "constructive discharge," see Pennsylvania 
State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129,134 (2004) ("[T]o establish 'constructive discharge,' 
the plaintiff ... must show that the abusive working environment became so intolerable 
that her resignation qualified as a fitting response. "). 
20. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b). The "jurisdictional element" is sometimes referred 
to as the "jurisdictional hook." See Tara M. Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the 
Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting Federal Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2101, 2101 (2006). Other portions of the statutory definition 
482 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:477 
employee-numerosity requirement is that an employer must have 
fifteen or more employees to fall within the confines of the stat­
ute.21 The jurisdictional element states that the employer must be 
"engaged in an industry affecting commerce."22 The purpose of this 
include exceptions for, inter alia, the United States and private clubs. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(b )(1 )-(2). 
21. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b). 
22. Id. The employee-numerosity requirement and jurisdictional element in Title 
VII are structurally the same as the analogous requirements in other federal antidis­
crimination legislation, including the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Fam­
ily and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA). 
The ADA outlaws employment discrimination on the basis of disability. Id. 
§ 12,112(a) ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application proce­
dures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."). It wholly incor­
porates a variety of sections from Title VII, including the provision granting jurisdiction 
to the federal courts. Id. § 12,117(a) ("The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth 
in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the pow­
ers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to the Commission, to the At­
torney General, or to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in 
violation of any provision of this chapter ...."). The incorporation of the jurisdiction­
granting provision is a true redundancy because the federal question jurisdiction statute 
had been amended in 1980, ten years before the passage of the ADA, to eliminate the 
amount-in-controversy requirement. See Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 
§ 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (amending 28 U.S.c. § 1331 to remove the amount in controversy 
requirement). As in Title VII, the ADA's definitions are in a separate section. See 42 
U.S.c. § 12,111. Further definitions are included in yet another section. See id. § 12102 
(providing the definition for the ADA); 42 U.S.c. § 12,102(1) (defining the terms "aux­
iliary aids and services"); id. § 12,102(2), (defining the term "disability"); id. § 12,102(3) 
(defining "State"). "Employer" is defined, as in Title VII, to mean a person with fifteen 
or more employees. Id. § 12,111(5)(A). This was the original limitation when the stat­
ute was first enacted in 1990. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101­
336, § 101(5)(A), 104 Stat. 327, 330. The jurisdictional hook, in the same section, uses 
the same wording as Title VII. 42 U.S.c. § 12,111(5)(A) ("The term 'employer' means 
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ...."). Thus, the ADA is identical 
to Title VII in the portions of the statute at issue in Arbaugh. 
The ADEA bars discrimination in employment on the basis of age. 29 U.S.c. 
§ 623(a) (making it unlawful to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ­
ual's age"). The Act does not explicitly grant jurisdiction to the federal courts, but it 
does create a private right of action. Id. § 626(c)(1) ("Any person aggrieved may bring 
a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as 
will effectuate the purposes of this chapter ...."). This right of action combines with 28 
U.s.c. § 1331, granting jurisdiction to the federal courts over "civil actions arising 
under the ... laws ... of the United States," to give the federal courts the power to hear 
ADEA cases. The statute, as contrasted with Title VII, see supra text accompanying 
notes 18-20, does not appear to have granted jurisdiction over all ADEA cases until 28 
U.S.c. § 1331 was amended to eliminate the amount-in-controversy requirement. The 
definition of "employer," as in the other statutes, is in a separate section. See 29 U.S.c. 
§ 630(b). ADEA defines an "employer" as a person having twenty or more employees 
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latter element is to provide a nexus to interstate commerce so as to 
ensure that the statute is only applied in cases over which Congress 
has legitimate constitutional regulatory power under the Commerce 
Clause.23 
Weighty issues of constitutionality and the scope of federal leg­
islative power were not explicitly raised by the parties to the litiga­
tion. The question presented to the Court, on which the circuits 
had previously split,24 was seemingly a minor technical issue: Is Ti­
tle VII's employee-numerosity requirement a limitation on federal 
subject-matter jurisdiction or is it a part of the plaintiff's cause of 
action?25 Referring to the question presented as "minor" is not to 
denigrate the importance of the decision in this case. The answer to 
the question posed in the litigation has numerous consequences for, 
and the jurisdictional element again uses the same language as that found in Title VII. 
Jd. ('''[E]mployer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 
twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar 
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year ...."). As with Title VII, the ADEA's 
original employee-numerosity requirement was twenty-five. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § l1(b), 81 Stat. 602, 605. This was amended to 
the current number in 1974. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-259, § 28(a)(1), 88 Stat. 55, 74. 
Finally, the FMLA entitles employees to take medical leave without loss of their 
jobs or benefits. 29 U.S.c. § 2614(a)(1) ("[A]ny eligible employee who takes leave 
under [the FMLA] shall be entitled, on return from such leave-(A) to be restored ... 
to the position of employment held ... when the leave commenced; or (B) ... an 
equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits"); id. § 2614(a)(2) ("The tak­
ing of leave under [the FMLA] shall not result in the loss of any employment benefit 
accrued prior to the date on which the leave commenced."). As in the ADEA, the 
FMLA does not have an explicit jurisdiction-granting provision, instead it relies on 28 
U.S.c. § 1331 combined with a statutory private right of action. /d. § 2617(a)(2) ("An 
action to recover ... damages or equitable relief ... may be maintained against any 
employer ... in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction."). The definition 
of "employer" is again found in a separate section. Jd. § 2611(4)(A). An "employer" 
for FMLA purposes is one that has at least fifty employees. Jd. § 2611(4)(A)(i). This 
number is the same as when the statute was originally passed. Family and Medical 
Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 101(4)(A)(i), 107 Stat. 6, 8. In the FMLA, 
however, the jurisdictional hook is slightly different from that found in the other three 
statutes. Here, it states that the employer must be "engaged in commerce or in any 
industry or activity affecting commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i). This jurisdictional 
element appears slightly broader than that of the other statutes as a result of the "or 
activity" language not found in the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII hooks. This difference 
will not playa role in the analysis to follow, however. 
23. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) ("[A] jurisdictional element 
... would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the [activity) in question affects 
interstate commerce."); see also Stuckey, supra note 20, at 2102 ("A jurisdictional hook 
is a statutory clause requiring that the regulated activity have a connection with inter­
state commerce."). 
24. See supra note 14. 
25. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006). 
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at the very least, antidiscrimination litigation.26 This is particularly 
true because of shared attributes of a variety of federal antidis­
crimination statutes that make the Arbaugh decision applicable be­
yond the Title VII context.27 
The issue of whether the employee-numerosity requirement is 
jurisdictional arose because of the confusion regarding the number 
of employees who worked at the restaurant.28 After judgment was 
rendered for the plaintiff, the employer raised, for the first time, the 
fact that it had fewer than fifteen employees and thus could not 
properly be found liable under Title VII.29 The employer claimed 
that because it did not employ the requisite number of employees, 
the district court never had subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
case, and thus that the judgment had to be vacated.3D The defen­
dant's post-judgment motion for dismissal relied on Rule 12 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which defines the defenses that a 
party can raise to a claim, along with when and how those defenses 
may be made.31 The Rule 12(b)(1) defense of "lack of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter"32 relied on by the employer can be raised 
at any time, by a party or by the court, even after judgment has 
been entered.33 
The employee's argument in response was that the employee­
numerosity requirement does not affect the jurisdiction of the fed­
eral district courts,34 but rather it is an element of the plaintiff's 
cause of action. Thus, a dismissal for failure to satisfy that element 
would be for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
26. See supra note 12 (discussing the concrete consequences of the "jurisdiction 
or merits" dichotomy). 
27. See supra note 22 (discussing relevant similarities between Title VII and other 
antidiscrimination legislation). 
28. The statutory definition of "employee" is hardly free from ambiguity, as it 
defines an employee merely as "an individual employed by an employer," 42 U.S.c. 
§ 2000e(f) (2000), which begs the question, among others, of what it means for someone 
to be employed. In this case, the dispute was over whether delivery drivers, the owner­
managers, and the spouses of the owners were employees within the meaning of the 
statute. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., No. Civ. A. 01-3376, 2003 WL 1797893, at *2 
(E.D. La. Apr. 3,2003), affd, 380 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
29. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 504 (2006). 
30. See generally Memorandum in Support of Rule 12(h)(3) Motion to Dismiss 
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., No. Civ. A. 01-3376, 
2002 WL 33000724 (E.D. La. Nov. 19,2002); Rule 12(h)(3) Motion to Dismiss for Lack 
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Arbaugh, No. Civ. A. 01-3376, 2002 WL 33000724. 
31. See FED. R. CJv. P. 12. 
32. /d. at 12(b )(1). 
33. Id. at 12(h)(3). 
34. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 380 F.3d 219, 223 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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granted."35 This defense, unlike the subject-matter jurisdiction de­
fense, can be raised only before or during the trial.36 Thus if the 
defense is not raised at that time, it is considered waived.37 
The trial court, bound by the precedent in the Fifth Circuit,38 
found that the employee-numerosity requirement did in fact de­
scribe a limitation on its subject-matter jurisdiction, and accordingly 
found that the defense was not waived.39 It ordered discovery on 
the issue of the number of employees.4o Upon finding that the em­
ployer actually did not have the requisite number of employees, the 
judge vacated the judgment and dismissed the case.41 
The Supreme Court reversed, deciding that the employee­
numerosity requirement is an element of the plaintiff's cause of ac­
tion, not a limitation on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the fed­
eral courtS.42 In so holding, it made much of the fact that Title 
VII's jurisdiction-granting provision and employee-numerosity min­
imum were contained in separate sections of the statute.43 The 
Court also pointed to '''unfair[ness)' and 'waste of judicial re­
sources'" without further explanation.44 This is likely a reference 
to the idea that the employer should have raised this issue before or 
at the trial instead of waiting until later. This resulted in the "un­
fairness" that the employee had her judgment taken away and a 
"waste of judicial resources" in having a full trial on the merits 
when none was actually necessary.45 
35. FED. R. CJv. P. 12(b)(6). 
36. Id. at 12(h)(2) ("A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted ... may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a), or by 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits."). 
37. E.g., Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Constr., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 870 (4th 
Cir. 1999) ("Essentially, [defendant] asserts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a 
claim. But there is no authority for such a motion to be brought after trial."). 
38. See Arbaugh, 380 F.3d at 223-25 (discussing Fifth Circuit precedent and af­
firming the trial court's decision that the employee-numerosity requirement is 
jurisdictional). 
39. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., No. Civ. A. 01-3376, 2003 WL 1797893, at *10, 
(E.D. La. Apr. 3, 2003), affd, 380 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
40. Id. at *1. 
41. Id. at *10. 
42. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513-14 (2006). 
43. Id. at 515 ("[T]he [fifteen]-employee threshold appears in a separate provi­
sion that 'does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of 
the district courts.'" (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 
(1982))). 
44. Id. (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari app. at 47, Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 
500 (No. 04-944». 
45. See id. 
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Finally, with no further reasoning than a statement that "the 
ball" should be left "in Congress' court,"46 the Court laid down a 
bright-line rule.47 The Court stated that "when Congress does not 
rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts 
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character."48 The 
Court did not give reasons for this broad holding beyond those al­
ready given for its narrower decision that the employee-numerosity 
requirement is not jurisdictional. Furthermore, it decided not to 
explain what it meant by the phrase "rank a statutory limitation on 
coverage as jurisdictional."49 Nothing in the Court's statement of 
the rule, therefore, prevents the applicability of the same rule to the 
other limiting provision in Title VII's definition of "employer," the 
jurisdictional element permitting application of Title VII only to 
employers who are "engaged in an industry affecting commerce."50 
This application of the bright-line rule will prove to have far-reach­
ing consequences for the extent of Congress's power to regulate 
under the Commerce Clause.51 
B. The Commerce Clause Jurisprudence 
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate 
interstate commerce.52 Although the entire history of the Supreme 
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence is far beyond the scope of 
this Article,53 this Part briefly discusses three recent, relevant cases 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 516. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b) (2000). See infra Part III for a discussion of the impor­
tance of the application of the Arbaugh bright-line rule to the jurisdictional element of 
Title VII. 
51. See infra Part III. Indeed, in the aftermath of Arbaugh, the lower federal 
courts have applied the bright-line rule in a variety of contexts. See Minard v. ITC 
DeJtacom Commc'n, Inc., 447 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2006) (applying the rule to the FMLA); 
Partington v. Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 443 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2006) (applying 
the rule to the Securities Act of 1933); Sanders v. United States, No. 06-354, 2006 WL 
2735248, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2006) (applying the rule to the Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights). 
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate 
Commerce ... among the several States."). 
53. Any number of sources might provide the relevant background material. See, 
e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 807-17 (3d ed. 2000) 
(describing interpretations of the Commerce Clause through three major epochs: pre­
1887, 1887-1937, and 1937-1995). 
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that interpret the Commerce Clause and set out the boundaries 
within which Congress can regulate.54 
In 1995, the Court in United States v. Lopez declared a federal 
statute unconstitutional on Commerce Clause grounds for the first 
time since 1936,55 thus signaling to Congress an end of judicial per­
missiveness of legislative action under the Commerce Clause that 
had developed since the New Dea1.56 The case concerned a statute 
criminalizing gun possession near schools.57 The Court drew a dis­
tinction between economic and noneconomic activity: economic ac­
tivity that substantially affected interstate commerce was within 
Congress's commerce power, while noneconomic activity was nop8 
The Court then decided that gun possession, the activity regulated 
in the statute, is noneconomic, and thus could not be constitution­
ally regulated by Congress.59 
Because the activity was noneconomic, the Court looked for 
other bases on which Congress might be found to have legitimately 
regulated gun possession, but found none.60 The Court faulted 
Congress for two failures in its drafting of the provision. First, the 
statute did not contain a jurisdictional element that would allow a 
court to decide as each case arose whether the firearm possession at 
issue actually had an effect on interstate commerce.61 Second, Con­
gress had made no legislative findings that the type of gun posses­
sion regulated by the statute had a substantial effect on interstate 
54. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
55. Joseph D. Grano, Teaching the Commerce Clause, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1163,1164 
n.3 (1998) ("[F]or the first time in sixty years, the Supreme Court invalidated a law as 
exceeding Congress's commerce clause power."); Kramer, supra note 1, at 138 ("[F]or 
the first time in six decades the Court struck down a federal statute as exceeding the 
limits of the Commerce Clause."); see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 
(1936). 
56. Again, a full discussion of the depth and breadth of this permissiveness is 
beyond the scope of this Article. The interested reader might consult TRIBE, supra note 
53, at 811-17 (discussing the major Commerce Clause cases from NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), until just before Lopez). 
57. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 ("In the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Con­
gress made it a federal offense 'for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a 
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.'" 
(quoting 18 U.S.c. § 922(q)(I)(A) (Supp. V 1988))). 
58. ld. at 559-61. The Court stated that this distinction between economic and 
noneconomic activity was not new, but arose through an analysis of its prior cases, 
which established a "pattern" that was "clear." ld. at 560. 
59. ld. at 567. 
60. ld. at 564-68. 
61. ld. at 561; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdic­
tional elements). 
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commerce.62 Thus, a noneconomic activity, without either evidence 
that it affects interstate commerce or a jurisdictional element ensur­
ing that the only cases over which federal power will be exercised 
will be those involving interstate commerce, could not be validly 
regulated under the Commerce Clause. 
United States v. Morrison involved a provision in the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA),63 which established a federal cause 
of action for victims of gender-motivated violence.64 The case reaf­
firmed and extended the principles espoused in Lopez. Although 
Congress passed the VAWA before the Court decided Lopez,65 the 
Act was accompanied by findings that specifically established Con­
gress's view that gender-motivated violence affects interstate com­
merce.66 This evidence did not appease the Court, however. It 
again found that the activity Congress attempted to regulate was 
not economic in nature.67 The Court also rejected the validity of 
Congress's findings because the reasoning employed could be used 
to show that nearly any activity has an effect on interstate com­
merce, thus putting every aspect of citizens' lives within the reach of 
congressional regulation.68 Furthermore, the Court noted, as in Lo­
62. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 ("[T]o the extent that congressional findings would 
enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially 
affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the 
naked eye, they are lacking here."): 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 13,981 (2000), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598 (2000). 
64. Id. § 13,981(c) ("A person ... who commits a crime of violence motivated by 
gender and thus deprives another of the right [to be free from crimes of violence moti­
vated by gender] shall be liable to the party injured ...."). 
65. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-322, § 40,302, 108 Stat. 1796, 1941-42. 
66. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 ("In contrast with the lack of congressional findings 
that we faced in Lopez, § 13981 is supported by numerous findings regarding the seri­
ous impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families."); see, e.g., 
H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1853 
("Congress has found that ... crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial 
adverse effect on interstate commerce[] by deterring potential victims from traveling 
interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting 
with business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce; crimes of violence moti­
vated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce[ ] by dimin­
ishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the 
supply of and the demand for interstate products ...."). 
67. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 ("Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in 
any sense of the phrase, economic activity."). 
68. Id. at 615 ("Congress' findings are substantially weakened by the fact that 
they rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as unwork­
able if we are to maintain the Constitution's enumeration of powers.... Given these 
findings ... the concern that we expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the Com­
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pez, that there was no jurisdictional element to save the constitu­
tionality of the statute.69 
The Court's new Commerce Clause jurisprudence continued 
on this course for just five years. In 2005, the Court decided Raich 
v. Gonzales with a result contrary to those in Lopez and Morrison: 
The federal statute under attack was not struck down as represent­
ing an overreaching of the Commerce Clause power.70 Raich dealt 
with the question of whether application of the Controlled Sub­
stances Act (CSA)71 was a valid exercise of the commerce power.72 
Federal agents acting pursuant to the CSA seized and destroyed a 
California resident's marijuana plants.73 The plants were grown for 
personal medical use, which was permitted by California state 
law.74 
Despite the contrary outcome, Raich neither overruled the re­
sults reached nor repudiated the approach employed in Morrison 
and Lopez.75 The decision relied first on the fact that there is an 
interstate market for marijuana, and thus growing the plants, even 
for personal use, was an economic activity. Second, it rested on the 
fact that the CSA was a comprehensive statute, regUlating in-state 
possession as a mere incident of its larger regulation of controlled 
substances.76 The majority opinion therefore did not subject the 
CSA to the kind of scrutiny employed by the Court in the earlier 
two cases. First, the concept of a "jurisdictional element" is not 
mentioned in the majority opinion. Second, discussion of Con­
merce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national 
and local authority seems well founded."). The Court quoted VAWA's legislative his­
tory to show the objectionable reasoning. Id. (quoting H.R. REp. No. 103-711, at 385). 
69. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (stating that VAWA "contains no jurisdictional ele­
ment establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power to 
regulate interstate commerce"). 
70. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). 
71. 21 U.S.c. §§ 801-971 (2000). 
72. Raich, 545 U.S. at 5 ("The question presented in this case is whether the 
[commerce] power ... includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of 
marijuana in compliance with California law."). 
73. Id. at 7. 
74. Id. 
75. See Alex Kreit, Rights, Rules, and Raich, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 705,719 (2006) 
("Although the Raich majority did not apply or mention Lopez's test, it treated Lopez 
as established law and did not claim to overrule either Lopez or Morrison."). 
76. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18 ("[R]espondents are cultivating, for home consumption, 
a fungible commodity for which there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate mar­
ket."). The Lopez and Morrison opinions, by contrast, had found that gun possession 
near schools and gender-motivated violence were not economic activities. See United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,561 
(1995). 
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gress's findings regarding the effects of drug manufacturing and dis­
tribution were confined to a footnote77 and deemed valid in just 
one sentence,78 in sharp contrast to Morrison's scrutiny of the mode 
of analysis of the congressional record.79 Further, in response to 
the complaint that Congress did not make specific findings regard­
ing intrastate activities involving marijuana, the Court stated that 
particularized findings were not necessary. 80 
The final outcome, in terms of being able to predict what will 
happen in the next Commerce Clause case to arise, is uncertain. 
The decisive factor in the recent cases appears to be the economic 
nature of the activity Congress seeks to regulate. However, while 
Lopez, Morrison, and Raich taken as a whole support this view, it 
has remained unclear whether this distinction will hold up, in no 
small part because of the apparent ideological divisions of the 
Court that decided these three cases. Lopez and Morrison were 
both decided by five-to-four vote, with the same arrangement of 
votes in each.81 The majority in Raich, though, consisted of the 
four Lopez and Morrison dissenters along with one member of the 
majority from those cases.82 It would thus be easy to characterize 
these decisions as the product of two groups of ideologues, or even 
political partisans,83 with one group voting consistently to uphold 
77. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 12-13 n.20. 
78. See id. at 20 ("Findings in the introductory sections of the CSA explain why 
Congress deemed it appropriate to encompass local activities within the scope of the 
CSA."). 
79. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
80. Raich, 545 U.S. at 21. 
81. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550. The majority in each 
case was formed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, 
and Thomas. Justices Souter, Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg dissented. This split of 
votes, furthermore, is the same as that displayed in a variety of important cases in re­
cent years. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426,429 (2004) ("enemy combatant" 
case); NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001) (definition of "supervi­
sor" in the National Labor Relations Act); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001) (right to 
counsel); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,358 (2001) (Section 5 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (presiden­
tial election of 2000). 
82. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 3-4. Justice Kennedy switched sides. Justice Scalia also 
voted to uphold the statute, but concurred only in the judgment. Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) ("I agree with the Court's holding that the Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA) may validly be applied to respondents' cultivation, distribution, and possession 
of marijuana for personal, medicinal use."). 
83. For some, Bush v. Gore illustrated the partisan nature of that Court's mem­
bers. See, e.g., Christopher P. Banks, The Constitutional Politics of Interpreting Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REv. 425,471 (2003) ("Therein lies the 
significance of Bush [v. Gore] as well, because the Court's selection of a Republican 
candidate insures that the controlling coalition will remain intact for years to come."); 
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congressional exercise of Commerce Clause power and the other 
group voting, wherever reasonably feasible, to restrict such exer­
cise.84 The question of where the Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
is going, particularly with the departure of two members of the 
Court that decided these three cases,85 is thus very much up in the 
air.86 Gleaning hints about the Court's stance on the commerce 
power from sources such as Arbaugh87 may help clear the picture. 
C. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Congressional power to regulate small intrastate employers to 
promote its antidiscrimination ideals might not depend solely on 
the Commerce Clause. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees 
"equal protection of the laws"88 to all citizens and, in Section 5, 
gives Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions" of the Amendment.89 Thus, it is possible that Con­
gress could act to prevent discrimination regardless of the effect on 
interstate commerce through the Section 5 power. This is particu­
larly true because the Section 5 power is broader than the ability to 
simply restate the Amendment. That is, Congress may employ the 
Section 5 power to pass legislation prohibiting conduct that is not 
David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 
737-38 (2001) ("The conclusion that emerges, in my view, is that several members of the 
Court-perhaps a majority-were determined to overturn any ruling of the Florida Su­
preme Court that was favorable to Vice President Gore, at least if that ruling signifi­
cantly enhanced the Vice President's chances of winning the election."). 
84. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Fighting Federalism with Federalism: If It's Not Just 
a Battle Between Federalists and Nationalists, What Is It?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081, 
2081 (2006) ("The four moderate-to-liberal Justices on what was the Rehnquist Court 
have countered the federalism revival at every turn. They even have indicated a desire 
to overturn aspects of it if they obtain a fifth vote."); Nelson Lund, Fig Leaf Federalism 
and Tenth Amendment Exceptionalism, 22 CaNsT. COMMENT. 11, 15 (2005) ("(J]ust as 
the federalist dissenters in Garcia refused to accept defeat, so the nationalist dissenters 
in these cases have vowed to continue a fight in which they expect eventually to 
prevail. "). 
85. Chief Justice Rehnquist passed away in September 2005 and Justice 
O'Connor retired in January 2006. Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Rehnquist Dies at 
80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 13934870 (Westlaw). 
86. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, Not the Constitu­
tion in Exile, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 669, 670 (2006) ("Until United States v. Lopez you 
could not argue the Commerce Clause; after Gonzales v. Raich, it is not clear you can 
argue the Commerce Clause anymore." (citation omitted»; Lund, supra note 84, at 15 
("The reach of Lopez and Morrison may turn out to be extremely narrow. That at least 
appears to be the implication of the 6-3 decision in Gonzales v. Raich, which seems to 
limit Lopez and Morrison . ..." (emphases added) (citation omitted». 
87. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2000). 
88. U.S. CaNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. 
89. Id. § 5. 
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itself unconstitutional.9° However, the Court has never permitted 
an interpretation of the Section 5 power that reaches private actors, 
and thus any power Congress has to regulate the private actors 
made subject to Title VII must come from the Commerce Clause. 
While the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment 
may have been to allow regulation of all activity, public or private, 
that violated the civil liberties of citizens,91 the Supreme Court 
quickly established that such a broad reading of the Amendment 
would not carry the day. Seven years after the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held in United States v. Cruik­
shank92 that the Amendment "adds nothing to the rights of one 
citizen as against another."93 Rather, it protects individuals against 
violations of individual rights by the states only.94 Four years later, 
the Court reiterated this view in Virginia v. Rives ,95 writing, "The 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution ... 
have reference to State action exclusively, and not to any action of 
private individuals."96 
While Cruikshank and Rives did not discuss Section 5 explic­
itly, two 1883 cases showed that the state-action principle applied to 
that section as well. First was United States v. Harris ,97 in which 
Justice Woods quoted extensively from Cruikshank and also cited 
Rives favorably.98 The Court in Harris firmly stated that the statute 
could not be supported "by any clause in the Fourteenth Amend­
ment," because it was directed solely at private activity.99 
Finally came the Civil Rights Cases .100 At stake was the first 
section of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which mandated that citi­
zens be given the same treatment at places like inns and theaters, 
90. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) ("Section 5 is 'a 
positive grant of legislative power' that includes authority to 'prohibi[t] conduct which 
is not itself unconstitutional and [to] intrud[e] into "legislative spheres of autonomy 
previously reserved to the States. ",,, (citations omitted) (quoting first Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966); quoting second City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507, 518 (1997))). 
91. See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 
MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1329-33 (1952). 
92. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
93. Id. at 554. 
94. Id. 
95. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). 
96. Id. at 318. 
97. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882). 
98. Id. at 638-39. 
99. Id. at 640 (emphasis added). 
100. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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regardless of race. IOI Congress had relied on the Fourteenth 
Amendment in passing this statute.102 The Court, however, reiter­
ated that the Fourteenth Amendment was effective only against 
state action.103 Section 5 was dismissed as a possible ground on 
which Congress might rely to justify the constitutionality of the 
Civil Rights Act because Section 5 merely grants Congress the right 
"[t]o adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such 
prohibited State law and State acts, and thus to render them effectu­
ally null, void, and innocuous."104 Thus Congress could not regu­
late the private owners of the inns and theaters under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
In 1966, there was some hope that the Court might move to a 
broader reading of Section 5 after the Court decided United States 
v. Guest.1°5 Guest discussed 18 U.S.c. § 241, which makes it illegal 
to conspire to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person 
... in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege se­
cured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States."106 
In deciding the case, the Court noticeably said nothing about Sec­
tion 5.1°7 However, a majority of the Justices did, in separate opin­
ions, express their views as to the breadth of Section 5. Justice 
Clark, joined by two other Justices, wrote in his concurrence that 
"the specific language of [Section] 5 empowers the Congress to en­
act laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action­
that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights."108 Justice Bren­
nan, also joined by two other Justices, used similar though slightly 
less bald language in his concurring and dissenting opinion.109 Be­
101. [d. at 8-9. 
102. [d. at 10. The Commerce Clause jurisprudence of that time had not yet de­
veloped to the pro-federal power heights it reached after the New Deal. See TRIBE, 
supra note 53, at 811-17. 
103. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 ("It is state action of a particular character 
that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of 
the amendment."). 
104. [d. (emphasis added). 
105. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
106. 18 U.S.c. § 241 (2000). 
107. Guest, 383 U.S. at 755 ("[N]othing said in this opinion goes to the question 
of what kinds of other and broader legislation Congress might constitutionally enact 
under [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to implement that Clause ...."). 
108. [d. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
109. [d. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Section] 
5 authorizes Congress to make laws that it concludes are reasonably necessary to pro­
tect a right created by and arising under that Amendment; and Congress is thus fully 
empowered to determine that punishment of private conspiracies interfering with the 
exercise of such a right is necessary to its full protection." (emphasis added)). 
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cause there was no overlap in the Justices joining the Clark and 
Brennan opinions, six Justices appeared to support the idea that 
Section 5 could be used to regulate private activity.110 
However, neither that Court nor any future Court had de­
clared those views to be law by 2000, when Morrison was decided. 
The five-Justice majority in Morrison favorably cited Harris and the 
Civil Rights Cases ll1 while dismissing the opinions of the six Jus­
tices in Guest as mere dicta, stating, with an air of hauteur, that 
"[t]his is simply not the way that reasoned constitutional adjudica­
tion proceeds."112 Thus, the majority not only held that the civil 
rights remedy of VAWA was not a proper exercise of the Com­
merce Clause, but also that it could not be upheld under Section 
5113 because it aimed to regulate private activity only, and in so 
doing, punished only private actors.114 Thus, Section 5 power can 
only be used to reach state actors. 
The language of Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke stating that Title VII was passed pursuant to both Section 5 
and the Commerce Clause115 is not to the contrary. The definition 
of "employer" does not exclude state governments from Title VII 
coverage. The states, however, have sovereign immunity unless 
that immunity is validly abrogated by Congress. While Congress 
cannot validly abrogate the states' sovereign immunity through leg­
islation under the Commerce Clause, it can do so through its Sec­
tion 5 power.u6 Thus, both the commerce power and Section 5 
were needed to pass Title VII: the commerce power was needed 
because the Section 5 power cannot reach private conduct, and the 
Section 5 power was needed because the commerce power cannot 
be used to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 
110. See also id. at 782 & n.6 (pointing out that a majority is of the opinion that 
the Section 5 power is not limited to state action). 
111. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,621-22 (2000). 
112. Id. at 624. 
113. Id. at 626 ("[VAWA] is directed not at any State or state actor, but at individ­
uals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias. "). 
114. Id. at 627 ("Congress' power under [Section] 5 does not extend to the enact­
ment of [VAWA]."). 
115. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 367 (1978) ("Title VII 
was enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and [Section] 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment."). 
116. E.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) 
("Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I. . . . Congress mayL however,] 
subject nonconsenting States to suit in federal court when it does so pursuant to a valid 
exercise of its [Section] 5 power." (citations omitted». 
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While the Court has divided over Section 5 since Morrison, the 
passel of later cases have involved only the question of whether 
Congress could properly abrogate states' sovereign immunity with 
Section 5 antidiscrimination legislation.117 These cases have not in­
volved private employers and, thus, even the decisions that upheld 
the use of Section 5 as a basis for civil rights legislation 118 did not 
affect the holding of Morrison and the earlier cases that the Court 
in Morrison relied on. Morrison, then, appears to have the last 
word as to whether Section 5 can be used to regulate private activ­
ity; with the answer being-as demonstrated above-no.119 
II. 	 CONGRESS HAS THE POWER TO REGULATE 
SMALL EMPLOYERS 
This Part argues that the Court's decision in Arbaugh assumes 
that Congress has the power to regulate employers regardless of 
how many employees they have. This conclusion proceeds as a log­
ical conclusion of principles of American government regarding ju­
dicial power to entertain cases and congressional power to legislate. 
The key to the argument will be demonstrating the link between 
Congress's substantive legislative jurisdiction and the federal 
courts' judicial jurisdiction.120 
117. See id. (holding that Title I of the ADA did not validly abrogate state sover­
eign immunity); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (stating that 
Title II of the ADA validly abrogated state sovereign immunity); Nev. Dep't of Human 
Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 734 (2003) (stating that the FMLA validly abrogated state 
sovereign immunity). 
118. See Lane, 541 U.S. 509; Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721. 
119. See supra notes 111-114 and accompanying text. 
120. The link between the power of these two bodies has been noted by courts 
before, though in less express terms than proposed here. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) ("[T]he Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Con­
gress [the power in question], and therefore [the statute] cannot grant jurisdiction 
...."); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,571-78 (1992) (dismissing a suit on 
congressionally created generalized grievance for lack of Article III standing); Verlin­
den B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480,491-97 (1983) (holding that because Con­
gress passed valid legislation pursuant to its foreign commerce power, it could grant 
jurisdiction over those cases); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 351 (1911) 
("[T]he jurisdiction of the court to entertain the proceeding, .. depends upon whether 
the jurisdiction conferred is within the power of Congress ...."); Osborn v. Bank of the 
U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) ("[W]hen a question to which the judicial 
power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original 
cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause 
...."). 
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Congress is a body of limited legislative jurisdiction, its power 
to pass laws being constrained by Article I of the Constitution.121 
Most relevant here is Congress's power to create the lower federal 
courts.122 Also explicit is Congress's right to determine the subject­
matter jurisdiction of the lower federal courts by granting jurisdic­
tion over certain classes of cases.123 However, Congress cannot ex­
ercise the power to grant jurisdiction over a class of cases unless it 
does so pursuant to one of its enumerated powers, such as the Com­
merce Clause.124 In other words, if Congress has no constitutional 
121. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Congress's power has been expanded beyond its 
original bounds by some of the amendments to the Constitution, notably Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
122. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
123. E.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448 (1850) ("Congress, having the 
power to establish the courts, must define their respective jurisdictions."). 
124. This is not an uncontroversial assertion. There seems, in fact, to be some 
understanding that it is not true at all. For instance, a number of courts have held that 
jurisdictional elements do not impact the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 531-32 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he 
'jurisdictional element' of the statute ... is 'jurisdictional' only in the shorthand sense 
that without that nexus, there can be no federal crime under the bombing statute. It is 
not jurisdictional in the sense that it affects a court's subject matter jurisdiction." (cita­
tion omitted». Further, it might be argued that supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367 (2000), cuts against my position on the link between federal jurisdiction and 
legislative power because it permits federal courts to hear state cases over which Con­
gress would have no power so long as they are sufficiently related to the federal claims 
at issue. 
Without attempting to fully resolve the argument here, I note that it seems rather 
inconsistent to impose federalism limitations on Congress alone. If the brand of feder­
alism created in the Constitution is meant to preserve the power of the states as the 
primary sources of power and authority over Americans, then permitting federal courts 
to exercise power where Congress cannot would seem to undercut those federalism 
ideals. Professor Laura Fitzgerald criticized a similar problem in the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence: its tendency to give lip service to the idea that jurisdictional issues must 
be resolved before merits questions while actually putting the merits issues first. This is 
problematic because the Constitution grants only limited powers to the federal govern­
ment. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1207, 1273 
(2001) ("The Court's merits-first jurisdictional tradition ... collides with some of the 
Constitution's most basic separation of powers values. At the heart of these is the prin­
ciple that all federal power is profoundly limited: that the Constitution's three gov­
erning institutions may use power only if and when affirmatively authorized to do so by 
that power's source."). Erie Railroad, Co. v. Tompkins might also provide support for 
this understanding. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the 
Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REv. 
79, 117 (1993) (noting that the Supreme Court justified Erie constitutionally by "im­
porting into Article III the Article I limits on congressional authority" (citing Erie R.R. 
v. 	Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938))). 
There has apparently been little judicial or scholarly attention paid to this particu­
lar area of federal governmental structure. Judith Resnik has noted that, while com­
mentary has focused on the issue of whether Congress can act as a "predator" 
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power to regulate in a certain area, then it has no constitutional 
power to grant the federal courts jurisdiction over cases in that 
area. 
Further, just as Congress has limited legislative jurisdiction, it 
is a commonplace of the American judicial system that the federal 
courts have only limited subject-matter jurisdiction.125 Article III 
of the Constitution lays out the only matters over which the federal 
courts may exercise jurisdiction.126 However, Article III is a ceiling 
on federal court jurisdiction, not a floor. That is, it sets the maxi­
mum power that Congress can grant to the courtS.127 Thus, if Con­
gress has not granted jurisdiction over a class of cases, then the 
federal courts have no right to exercise jurisdiction over those 
cases. This conclusion can be restated in terms similar to the con­
clusion reached above: If Congress has no power to grant jurisdic­
tion over a class of cases,128 then the federal courts have no power 
to exercise jurisdiction over those cases. 
To recap, if the Constitution does not grant Congress the 
power to regulate in a certain area, then Congress cannot grant ju­
risdiction to the federal courts over cases in that area. Further, if 
Congress cannot grant jurisdiction over cases in a certain area, then 
the federal courts have no power to exercise jurisdiction over cases 
in that area. Combining these two statements results in the follow­
ing proposition: If Congress has no power to regulate in an area, 
then the courts will not be able to exercise judicial jurisdiction over 
cases in that area. This conclusion can also be expressed in a posi­
tive fashion. That is, if the federal courts did have the power to 
(jurisdiction-stripping), recent Supreme Court cases have focused on whether Congress 
had conveyed too much authority to the federal courts. Judith Resnik, The Federal 
Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 
GEO. L.J. 2589, 2592-93 (1998). The cases Resnik cites, furthermore, are cases in which 
the Court held that Congress had violated Article III, not Article I. See Raines v. Byrd, 
521 U.S. 811 (1997) (Article III standing); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 
(1995) (holding that courts cannot be forced to reopen final judgments); Lujan v. De­
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing). 
125. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 
126. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, c1. 1. 
127. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) ("[W]hen 
a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the constitution, 
forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the 
Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause ...."). 
128. This is essentially equivalent to "if Congress has not granted jurisdiction." 
After all, if Congress has no power to grant jurisdiction, then it cannot legitimately 
grant jurisdiction. Rephrased in the same terms as used in the text, Congress cannot 
put itself in a situation where it has granted jurisdiction. 
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exercise jurisdiction over cases in some area, then Congress must 
have the power to regulate cases in that area.129 
Now recall Arbaugh's holding that the employee-numerosity 
requirement of Title VII does not limit the jurisdiction of the fed­
eral courtS.130 In other words, the federal courts have the power to 
exercise jurisdiction over Title VII cases involving employers with 
fewer than fifteen employeesPl Thus, applying the (positive) con­
clusion reached above, because the federal courts have the power to 
exercise jurisdiction over those cases,132 Congress must have the 
power to regulate employers with fewer than fifteen employees.133 
129. This statement is logically equivalent to the one established immediately 
above. That is, if one statement is true, then so is the other; and if one statement is 
false, then so is the other. If the equivalence of the two statements is not immediately 
obvious, consider the following nonlegal example: the statement, "If it is raining, then it 
is cloudy" is logically equivalent to the statement, "If it is not cloudy, then it is not 
raining." If the first statement is true (that is, if it only rains when there are clouds), 
then so is the second statement (for there can be no rain without clouds). If the first 
statement is false (if there can be rain without clouds), then the second is similarly false 
(because we cannot deduce a lack of rain from the absence of clouds). 
130. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006); see supra text accompa­
nying notes 42-50. 
131. Note that this does not mean that a federal court has the discretion not to 
dismiss a case against a small employer once it is presented with evidence that the 
requirements of Title VII are not met. The statute still states that a small employer 
cannot be held liable, and courts are bound to apply that statute faithfully. See 
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 501 (discussing the distinction between merits and jurisdiction). 
132. See infra text accompanying note 135. 
133. Deriving this conclusion about Congress's constitutional power to legislate 
from a case in which no constitutional issue is raised might seem to offend the doctrine 
of constitutional avoidance, that if the Court could decide the question without refer­
ence to the Constitution, then it would. However, this objection misunderstands the 
nature of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. The doctrine speaks not to a court 
addressing constitutional issues in general, but merely to the question of choosing be­
tween multiple interpretations of a statute, some of which raise issues of constitutional­
ity. Justice Frankfurter described the doctrine as "the principle of constitutional 
adjudication which makes it decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construc­
tion may raise serious constitutional questions avoided by another." United States v. 
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953); see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) 
("When the validity of an act of ... Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious 
doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first 
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question 
may be avoided."). In other words, if a court has two possible interpretations of a 
statute before it and one would raise questions about the constitutionality of the statute 
while the other would not, then the court should choose the interpretation that does not 
raise the constitutional issue. The Arbaugh Court had no such choice in front of it. 
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516. It could either decide that the employee-numerosity require­
ment was jurisdictional or was not. Id. The Court did not consider whether either 
interpretation would raise issues of the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 510-16. 
Furthermore, the idea that the Court is reluctant to speak on constitutional issues 
may actually support my argument. The core idea presented here is that the Court 
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III. CONGRESS'S POWER TO REGULATE ANY ACTIVITY 
This Part extends the conclusion reached in Part II to the juris­
dictional element of Title VII. It concludes, using the same reason­
ing that was applied in Part II, that as a logical consequence of the 
rule in Arbaugh, Congress has the power to regulate employers 
even if they have no link to interstate commerce. This conclusion, 
after Lopez and Morrison (and even after Raich), should be rather 
surprising. Part IV will go on to explore potential explanations 
rooted in the existing Commerce Clause precedent for this appar­
ent broad understanding of Congress's commerce power. 
A. Is Congress's Power to ReguLate SmaLL EmpLoyers Surprising? 
The conclusion reached in Part II, that the decision in Arbaugh 
implicitly stated that Congress has the power to regulate employers 
regardless of their size, begs the question: Has anything new been 
said about the scope of federal legislative power? Perhaps it was 
always understood that Congress could regulate regardless of the 
size of the employer. After all, it is likely that the employee-numer­
osity requirement was never intended to express Congress's inabiL­
ity to regulate smaller employers, but rather Congress's lack of 
wiLLingness to do so. Only two members of Congress are on record 
as supporting the view that the employee-numerosity requirement 
is in place to establish the constitutionality of Title VII, and neither 
of those members supported the statute.134 Further, if Congress 
cannot regulate employers smaller than a certain size, then there 
decided a significant constitutional issue without explicitly mentioning it. If it is ac­
cepted that the Court has an institutional norm of avoiding mentioning constitutional 
issues, then perhaps the idea that the Court decided a constitutional issue without say­
ing so becomes more palatable. The argument, however, does not depend on whether 
the Court knew or did not know what it was doing. If one believes that the Court 
understood the implications of the decision pointed out here, then Arbaugh can be read 
as illustrating the Court's conscious understanding of the nature of employment and the 
breadth of the Commerce Clause. If one believes, on the other hand, that the Court did 
not realize the implications explained here, then Arbaugh can be read as illustrating the 
Court's unconscious understanding of the Commerce Clause. That is, perhaps the 
Court has such a deep, innate understanding of employment as an economic activity 
and Congress's very broad power to regulate economic activity that the issues raised 
here do not even occur to the Justices. 
134. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 108 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 
2475 (statements of the separate minority views of the Honorable Richard H. Poff and 
the Honorable William Cramer) ("[The] theory is that the quantum of employees is a 
rational yardstick by which the interstate commerce concept can be measured. Out of 
thin air, the bill pulls a figure and determines that 25 employees is the magic number­
not 26 or 24 but 25."). 
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appears to be no justification for lowering that limit, as Congress 
did in 1972, when it changed the requirement from twenty-five em­
ployees to its current fifteen.135 Finally, if the employee-numerosity 
requirement exists for constitutional purposes, then the purpose of 
the jurisdictional element, limiting the coverage of the statute to 
employers "engaged in an industry affecting commerce,"136 is not 
clear. If the size of the employer is meant to serve as a proxy for 
the effect on interstate commerce, then there is no reason to make 
the affecting-commerce requirement explicit as well. 
All of that said, after Morrison and Lopez, a reasonable fear 
that Title VII might be found unconstitutional did in fact exist.137 
This would indicate that Congress's power to regulate even employ­
ers who satisfied both the employee-numerosity requirement and 
the jurisdictional element was in doubt. Thus, the revelation that 
the Court implicitly understands that Congress can regulate em­
ployers irrespective of their size may have significance in and of 
itself. 
More momentous, however, is that the same argument used to 
show that the employee-numerosity requirement is not part of a 
constitutional limitation on Congress can be applied to the jurisdic­
tional element of Title VII. The result will be analogous: Congress 
can regulate employers even if those employers have no effect on 
interstate commerce. A major task will then be to reconcile this 
broader and likely more surprising conclusion with the Court's still­
controlling138 position on the Commerce Clause taken in Lopez 
and Morrison. 
B. The Jurisdictional Element 
To reach the ultimate result that Congress can regulate em­
ployers even without a connection to interstate commerce, a poten­
tial explanation for Part II's conclusion that Congress can regulate 
small employers must be fleshed out. 
135. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(2), 86 
Stat. 103, 103. It might be argued that the lower limit is consistent with the idea of the 
employee-numerosity requirement as a proxy for an effect on interstate commerce. 
However, this argument will become less viable as shipping and cross-border communi­
cation become cheaper and more efficient. It is no longer true that only the biggest 
businesses have an effect on interstate commerce. 
136. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b) (2000). 
137. See Bagenstos, supra note 3; Boudreaux, supra note 3; Law, supra note 3; 
Leonard, supra note 3; Oleske, supra note 3; Rubenfeld, supra note 3; Virelli & Leibo­
witz, supra note 3. 
138. See, e.g., Kreit, supra note 75. 
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Congress relied on two powers to enact its civil rights legisla­
tion: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce 
Clause.139 It is rather easy, however, to dismiss the Section 5 power 
as a possible source of congressional regulation of small employers. 
Morrison makes clear that Congress can only regulate state action 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, including Section 5.140 Thus, 
it is highly unlikely that private employers, regardless of size 
or connection to interstate commerce, can be regulated under 
Section 5.141 
This leaves the Commerce Clause as the only source of power 
under which Congress can be said to have regulatory authority over 
small employers. After Lopez and Morrison, however, with their 
nondeferential scrutiny of congressional action under the Com­
merce Clause, it may be surprising to find that Congress retains the 
power to regulate very small local businesses that may not have an 
obvious connection to interstate commerce. 
The jurisdictional element of Title VII may provide reconcilia­
tion of Congress's ability to regulate small employers with the 
Court's stance in Lopez and Morrison. Recall that the definition of 
"employer" contains not just the employee-numerosity require­
ment,142 but also demands that the putative employer be "engaged 
in an industry affecting commerce."143 This appears to be precisely 
the type of jurisdictional element that the Lopez and Morrison 
opinions decried the absence of in the statutes challenged in those 
cases.144 The presence of the jurisdictional element in Title VII in­
dicates that perhaps the Court would not be concerned about the 
number of employees an employer has in a potential constitutional 
139. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 367 (1978) 
("Title VII was enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and 
[Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."). Recall that the Section 5 power serves to 
justify regulating state government employers. See supra text accompanying notes 115­
116. 
140. See supra text accompanying notes 111-119. 
141. See supra Part I.C (describing the Supreme Court's Section 5 jurisprudence 
with respect to Congress's ability to regulate private activity under the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
142. See 42 U.s.c. § 2000e(a) (2000) ("The term 'employer' means a person ... 
who has fifteen or more employees ...."). 
143. [d. 
144. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("Like the [statute] at 
issue in Lopez, [VAWA] contains no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal 
cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce."); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) ("[The statute] contains no jurisdic­
tional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm pos­
session in question affects interstate commerce. "). 
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challenge to the statute.145 So long as that employer has the re­
quired nexus to interstate commerce, it will fall in Lopez and Mor­
rison's third category of realms Congress can validly regulate under 
the Commerce Clause: "those activities having a substantial rela­
tion to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce. "146 In other words, the jurisdictional 
element would serve precisely the purpose such elements are sup­
posed to serve: It would ensure that any adjudication made by a 
federal court in a Title VII case has the requisite connection to in­
terstate commerce such that exercise of federal power is legitimate 
under the Constitution.147 
The problem with using the jurisdictional element of Title VII 
to square Congress's power to regulate small employers with Lopez 
and Morrison finds its foundation in the Arbaugh opinion. The 
Court used Arbaugh not merely to declare that the employee­
numerosity requirement in Title VII did not describe a limitation 
on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, but also as a 
vehicle to proclaim a broad bright-line rule:148 "[W]hen Congress 
does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, 
courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in charac­
ter."149 Taking this rule at face value, the jurisdictional element of 
Title VII, limiting the statute's effect to businesses "engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce,"150 cannot be said to limit the jurisdic­
tion of the federal courts.151 Nowhere does Title VII say that the 
federal courts shall only have jurisdiction over cases in which the 
employer is engaged in an industry affecting commerce. Rather, it 
merely states that an employer is someone who, among other re­
quirements, has the requisite effect on interstate commerce. The 
jurisdictional element modifies only who is affected by the statute, 
not the courts' power to adjudicate. Thus, the jurisdictional ele­
ment in Title VII does not satisfy the bright-line rule set out in 
145. See also text accompanying notes 134-136. 
146. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (quoting Lo­
pez, 514 U.S. at 558-59). 
147. See also supra note 23. 
148. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 502 (2006). 
149. Id. 
150. 42 U.s.C. § 2000e(a) (2000). 
151. That a jurisdictional element might not limit the jurisdiction of a court seems 
counterintuitive, but it must be remembered that there are two separate institutions in 
play, each with its own set of jurisdictional issues. Jurisdictional elements ensure that 
statutes are validly applied only to those parties who are within Congress's legislative 
jurisdiction. The judicial jurisdiction of the federal courts is not necessarily affected by 
these jurisdictional elements, as Arbaugh made clear. 
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Arbaugh and therefore does not limit the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.152 
Even if straightforward application of Arbaugh's bright-line 
rule did not settle the matter, the Court's reasoning in Arbaugh can 
also be applied to the jurisdictional element. Indeed, each of the 
two arguments the Court made in favor of declaring the employee­
numerosity requirement to be nonjurisdictional can be made with 
the same force for the jurisdictional element. First, the jurisdic­
tional element and the jurisdiction-granting provision appear in 
separate sections of the statute, just as the employee-numerosity 
requirement is separate from the jurisdiction-granting provision.153 
This would imply that Congress did not intend the jurisdictional el­
ement to limit the jurisdiction of the courts. If Congress did so in­
tend, why would it not draft the statute so that the jurisdictional 
grant itself contained the limitation? Second, if the jurisdictional 
element did limit the federal courts' jurisdiction, a defendant might 
raise the issue that it was not engaged in an industry affecting com­
merce until sometime after entry of judgment for the plaintiff, thus 
effecting the same "unfairness" and "waste of judicial resources" 
cited by the Court with respect to the employee-numerosity re­
quirement.154 Thus, whether the bright-line rule is applied directly 
to the jurisdictional element or whether the reasoning of the Court 
in Arbaugh is invoked, the same result is reached: The jurisdic­
tional element, requiring that employers be "engaged in an industry 
affecting commerce,"155 does not actually limit the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts. 
152. Here the terminology may begin to get a little confusing. After all, how 
could a "jurisdictional element" not limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts? One 
must recall that we are speaking of the jurisdiction of two separate bodies: the legisla­
tive jurisdiction of Congress and the judicial jurisdiction (or subject-matter jurisdiction) 
of the federal courts. Congress includes a jurisdictional element in a statute to ensure 
that the only subjects of that statute are those that Congress may validly regulate. In 
other words, the word "jurisdictional" in "jurisdictional element" refers to Congress's 
legislative jurisdiction, its power to regulate, not to the courts' judicial jurisdiction. 
153. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 ("[T]he IS-employee threshold appears in a 
separate provision that 'does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the 
jurisdiction of the district courts.'" (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 
U.S. 385, 394 (1982))). 
154. ld. 
155. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b). 
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C. 	 Congress Can Regulate Employers with No Effect on 
Interstate Commerce 
The jurisdictional element of Title VII has thus been shown to 
be analogous to the employee-numerosity requirement in that 
neither can be said to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
Therefore, the jurisdictional element is susceptible to the same ar­
gument as that made regarding the employee-numerosity require­
ment in Part II. That is, it can be shown that just as Congress can 
regulate employers regardless of whether they meet the fifteen-em­
ployee threshold, so Congress can regulate employers regardless of 
whether they meet the "affecting commerce" standard. The argu­
ment proceeds, in much briefer form than was used in Part II, in the 
following way. 
First, if Congress has no power to regulate employers not en­
gaged in an industry with an effect on interstate commerce, then it 
has no power to grant the federal courts jurisdiction over cases in­
volving such employers,156 Second, if Congress has no power to 
grant jurisdiction over cases involving employers not engaged in an 
industry with an effect on interstate commerce, then the federal 
courts have no power to exercise jurisdiction over those cases.157 
Thus, combining those two statements, if Congress has no 
power to regulate employers not engaged in an industry with an 
effect on interstate commerce, then the federal courts have no 
power to exercise jurisdiction over such cases.158 But, as before, 
this is equivalent to the positive statement that if the federal courts 
do have the power to exercise jurisdiction over cases involving em­
ployers not engaged in an industry with an effect on interstate com­
merce, then Congress must have the power to regulate such 
employers.159 
Finally, the Court in Arbaugh said that a limiting element in a 
statute must be clearly labeled as jurisdictional in order to limit the 
jurisdiction of the federal courtS.160 The jurisdictional element in 
Title VII is not expressly labeled as jurisdictional. Therefore, the 
jurisdictional element does not pass the bright-line test, and thus 
does not limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The denoue­
ment is that since federal courts do have power over these purely 
156. 	 See also supra notes 121-128 and accompanying text. 
157. 	 See also supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text. 
158. 	 See also supra text accompanying notes 134-135. 
159. 	 See also supra notes 135-140 and accompanying text. 
160. 	 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006). 
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intrastate employers, Congress must have constitutional authority 
to regulate them. 
To reiterate, the argument presented above is precisely the 
same as the argument presented in Part II. The only difference is 
the subject of the argument: in Part II, the subject was the em­
ployee-numerosity requirement; here, the subject was the jurisdic­
tional element. Thus, Congress has the power to regulate 
employers even if they are not engaged in an industry with an effect 
on interstate commerce. 
IV. 	 EXPLANATIONS FOR THE BROAD UNDERSTANDING 
OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 
Having established that Arbaugh's bright-line rule implies that 
Congress can regulate employers regardless of their connection to 
interstate commerce, the task is to square that with the existing 
Commerce Clause precedent; specifically, Lopez, Morrison, and 
Raich. I first argue in this Part that the distinctions used by Justice 
Stevens in Raich to show why the CSA should not fall victim to the 
same reasoning as the Gun-Free School Zone Act (in Lopez) or 
VAWA's civil remedy (in Morrison) do not apply to Title VII. I 
then argue that the understanding of Arbaugh is really less about 
broad federal power to regulate than it is a separation of powers 
question: Which branch is to determine what is economic and what 
is not?161 If Arbaugh means what it logically implies, then the 
Court has essentially ceded the authority to determine what activi­
ties are economic back to Congress. 
A. 	 Using Raich to Explain Congress's Power to Regulate Purely 
Intrastate Employers 
A surprising conclusion has been reached regarding Congress's 
power to regulate. The earlier attempt to reconcile the conclusion 
that Congress can regulate small employers by relying on the juris­
dictional element ran into the problem that the phrasing of the ju­
161. The links between the "federalism revolution" as represented by Lopez and 
Morrison and separation of powers questions have been explored by a few writers. See, 
e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Court: Congress as the Audience?, 574 AN­
NALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145 (2001); Melissa Irr, Note, United States v. Mor­
rison: An Analysis of the Diminished Effect of Congressional Findings in Commerce 
Clause Jurisprudence and a Criticism of the Abandonment of the Rational Basis Test, 62 
U. PITT. L. REV. 815 (2001). But see M. Elizabeth Magill, The Revolution that Wasn't, 
99 Nw. U. L. REV. 47 (2004) (arguing that there was no separation of powers 
revolution). 
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risdictional element combined with the bright-line rule in Arbaugh 
demonstrate that the jurisdictional element is not actually neces­
sary. However, Title VII's constitutionality apparently does not 
rely on an employer's effect on interstate commerce any more than 
it relies on the size of the employer. While this outcome seems con­
trary to Lopez and Morrison, it might still be reconciled with the 
recent Commerce Clause cases if the distinctions between Raich, on 
the one hand, and Morrison and Lopez, on the other, are drawn 
out. 
The first potential explanation regarding how Congress might 
have the constitutional authority to regulate employers of any size 
regardless of their lack of nexus to interstate commerce lies in the 
Raich decision. Raich distinguished the CSA from the statutes in 
question in Lopez and Morrison in two major ways. First, the CSA 
regulates activity that is "quintessentially economic,"162 in contrast 
to the noneconomic activity regulated in Lopez and Morrison. 163 
Second, the CSA was characterized as a comprehensive statute reg­
ulating interstate and international commerce, of which only a small 
but essential portion was challenged; however, Lopez and Morrison 
dealt with discrete regulations of specific activity.l64 
The first distinction provides a possible parallel between Title 
VII and the CSA. It seems very likely that regulation of employ­
ment, as undertaken by Title VII, is regulation of an economic ac­
tivity.165 After all, even if a firm does not engage in activity that 
162. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005). 
163. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("Gender-motivated 
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity."); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) ("[The statute in question] is a criminal statute 
that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, 
however broadly one might define those terms."). 
164. Raich, 545 U.S. at 24-25 ("[T]he CSA ... was a lengthy and detailed statute 
creating a comprehensive framework for regulating the production, distribution, and 
possession of five classes of 'controlled substances.' ... [The classification of marijuana 
as a Schedule I drug], unlike the discrete prohibition established by the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act of 1990, was merely one of many 'essential part[s] of a larger regula­
tion of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the 
intrastate activity were regulated.''' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561) (alteration in 
original)). 
165. Certainly employment would fall under the Raich definition of "economic": 
"'production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.''' Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-26 
(quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DlcrlONARY 720 (1966)); see also 
Adams v. Suozzi, 433 F.3d 220, 226 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[N]o extended discussion is re­
quired to show that employment agreements ... 'evidence[ ] a transaction involving 
commerce.''' (quoting 9 U.S.c. § 2 (2000)) (citation omitted) (alteration in original)). 
While Justice O'Connor takes issue with the majority's definition, stating that 
"[t]he [majority's] definition of economic activity is breathtaking," Raich, 545 U.S. at 49 
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might be referred to as "economic" or "commercial" (for example, 
a nonprofit think tank), an employee working at such firm is en­
gaged in the production of wages for herself. Even a court commit­
ted to closely scrutinizing Congress's determinations of whether an 
activity is fairly regulable under the Commerce Clause would not 
be likely to challenge that assertion.166 
Under the fair assumption that the Court understands employ­
ment to be an economic activity, Arbaugh may be merely consistent 
with Raich, adding nothing new to the boundaries of Congress's 
legislative power. That is, it might be said that Raich itself already 
established the principle that legislation under the Commerce 
Clause may be constitutional even without a jurisdictional element 
or any other limiting principle, so long as the regulated activity is 
clearly economic in nature.167 On this view, Arbaugh simply reaf­
firms the Raich principle that Congress does not need limiting ele­
ments, such as an employee-numerosity requirement or a 
jurisdictional element, to regulate under Title VII because employ­
ment is an economic activity. 
The difficulty with that argument is that Raich did not merely 
rely on the economic nature of growing marijuana for its distinction 
from Lopez and Morrison, but it also relied on the comprehensive­
ness of the CSA.168 The CSA regulates intrastate activity merely as 
a necessary consequence of its larger regulation of enormous 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), she shies away from actually providing her own definition, 
just as neither Lopez nor Morrison provided a definition. The closest Justice O'Connor 
comes to a definition is the statement that "economic activity usually relates directly to 
commercial activity." Id. at 50. This achieves nothing more than a substitution of the 
undefined word "commercial" for the undefined word "economic." See Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297-98 (1936) ("What is commerce? The term, as this 
court many times has said, is one of extensive import. No all-embracing definition has 
ever been formulated."). 
166. But see Allan Ides, Economic Activity as a Proxy for Federalism: Intuition 
and Reason in United States v. Morrison, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 563, 567-74 (2001) (dis­
cussing a variety of definitions of "economic activity" that the Court might be using and 
noting that the Court did not, in either Morrison or Lopez, define what it meant by 
"economic activity"). 
167. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (describing the Court's lack of 
concern with both jurisdictional elements and legislative history in finding an effect on 
interstate commerce). 
168. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 ("Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive 
legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was act­
ing well within its authority to 'make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper' to 
'regulate Commerce ... among the several States.' That the regulation ensnares some 
purely intrastate activity is of no moment. As we have done many times before, we 
refuse to excise individual components of that larger scheme." (quoting U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8». 
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amounts of interstate and international activity.169 Title VII, how­
ever, is arguably not the kind of comprehensive regulation of com­
merce represented by the CSA.170 It is, rather, a statute with one 
aim: to prohibit discrimination in employment based on certain ver­
boten categories. l7l It is thus in that regard more like Morrison's 
disputed VAWA provision, the only aim of which was to provide a 
civil rights remedy to victims of gender-motivated violence, and Lo­
pez's Gun-Free School Zones Act, which, in the words of the Raich 
majority, was a "brief, single-subject statute making it a crime for 
an individual to possess a gun in a school zone,"l72 than it is like the 
CSA, which the Court in Raich described as "a lengthy and detailed 
statute creating a comprehensive framework for regulating ... con­
trolled substances. "173 
If Title VII is viewed as a statute with a single aim, then 
Arbaugh is no mere corollary of Raich. The Raich majority relied 
169. See id. at 23 ("[W]e have often reiterated that '[w]here the class of activities 
is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no 
power "to excise, as trivial, individual instances" of the class.'" (quoting Perez v. United 
States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971))). 
170. Nor, for that matter, is the ADA, the ADEA, or the FMLA. See supra note 
22. 
171. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful employment prac­
tice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin ...."). 
172. Raich, 545 U.S. at 23. 
173. Id. at 24. It might be fairly argued that Title VII is not a single-subject stat­
ute but is rather a piece of the comprehensive Civil Rights Act of 1964 that covers 
various topics. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. 1,78 Stat. 241,241-42 
(amending 42 U.S.c. § 1971) (voting rights); Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. 2, 78 Stat. at 
243-46 (codified at 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000a to a-6) (discrimination in places of public accom­
modation); Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. 4, 78 Stat. at 246-49 (codified at 42 U.S.c. 
§§ 2000c to c-9) (desegregation of public education); Civil Rights Act of 1964 tit. 6, 78 
Stat. at 252-53 (codified at 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000d to d-4a) (discrimination in federally as­
sisted programs). Justice O'Connor made an analogous argument in her dissent in 
Raich, as she believed that the majority should have focused on the activity actually 
regulated rather than on the CSA as a whole. Raich, 545 U.S. at 48 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting) ("To ascertain whether Congress' encroachment is constitutionally justified 
in this case, then, I would focus here on the personal cultivation, possession, and use of 
marijuana for medicinal purposes."). If Title VII is in fact seen as more analogous to 
the CSA than to the statutes in Morrison and Lopez, then the outcome of Arbaugh 
pointed out in this Article is merely consistent with Raich. 
That said, the CSA was not merely labeled as comprehensive, but the challenged 
portion of that statute was also considered essential to the operation of the rest of the 
statute. It is not clear that the same applies to Title VII when considered as a portion of 
the larger Civil Rights Act of 1964. It seems unlikely that the voting rights portion of 
the Civil Rights Act would be undermined by a repeal of Title VII. 
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on economic activity, in part, and on breadth of regulation to distin­
guish Lopez and Morrison. Title VII may only lay claim to the for­
mer distinction, and yet Arbaugh implies that it is not only 
constitutional as written, but would be constitutional even upon re­
moval of the employee-numerosity requirement and jurisdictional 
element. In contrast, a hypothetical Title VII drafted without an 
employee-numerosity requirement and without a jurisdictional ele­
ment would not automatically be found constitutional under the 
Raich analysis because of its similarity to VAWA and the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act as a single-subject statute. Thus, because 
Arbaugh did in fact implicitly provide for the constitutionality of 
such a statute, a source beyond Raich must be sought for the basis 
of the Court's understanding that neither an employee-numerosity 
requirement nor a jurisdictional element are necessary to justify the 
constitutionality of this single-subject statute. 
B. Judicial Permissiveness of Regulation of Economic Activity 
Arbaugh's consequences have been shown to be not only 
somewhat contrary to Lopez and Morrison, but also to stretch be­
yond the Court's decision in Raich. By deciding Arbaugh the way it 
did, the Court may be signaling a new level of permissiveness to­
ward congressional regulation of economic activity. 
In stating that a holding that may permit Congress to regulate 
employment regardless of size or effect on interstate commerce, the 
Court pushed back against the spirit of the limitations it had im­
posed in Lopez and Morrison. The driving force behind those cases 
was that the Commerce Clause power was in danger of being ex­
tended too far through aggressive use of aggregation arguments. In 
Lopez, the government argued that violent crime near schools will 
handicap education, which will in turn have a harmful effect on the 
American economy.174 The Court rejected this argument for fear 
that acceptance would allow Congress to regulate anything it 
pieasedP5 The Court rejected a very similar argument in Morri­
son, where the legislative history of VAWA stated that gender-moti­
vated violence has a significant effect on interstate commerceP6 
The Court was again concerned with the breadth with which Con­
gress would be allowed to regulate if it permitted this aggregation 
174. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563-64 (1995). 
175. [d. at 564 ("[I]f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard 
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to 
regulate."). 
176. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000). 
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argument to succeedY7 These concerns later came to be known as 
the "non-infinity principle," referring to the Court's desire to avoid 
interpretations of the Commerce Clause that would allow Congress 
to regulate anything (thUS "infinity") it pleased.178 
By allowing for the constitutionality of Title VII even without a 
jurisdictional element, Arbaugh might simply be saying that the 
Court will not apply the non-infinity principle to economic activity, 
regardless of whether that activity is regulated in a large, compre­
hensive statute like the CSA, or in a more confined, single-subject 
statute like Title VII. Thus, under Arbaugh, if an activity is deemed 
economic, aggregation arguments will be accepted, making Con­
gress's power to regulate that type of activity almost limitless. 
C. Defining "Economic" 
Of course, the question of whether a regulated activity is actu­
ally economic lurks in the background of that conclusion. If the 
view is taken that employment is an indisputably economic activ­
ityp9 then the outcome of Arbaugh is merely a somewhat surpris­
ing extension of Raich: Congress can regulate any economic activity 
it wants to whatever extent it desires. However, the Court in Lopez 
asserted that, absent other considerations such as jurisdictional ele­
ments or congressional findings, the economic nature of the regu­
177. See id. ("[I]f Congress may regulate gender-motivated violence, it would be 
able to regulate murder or any other type of violence since gender-motivated violence, 
as a subset of all violent crime, is certain to have lesser economic impacts than the 
larger class of which it is a part."). 
178. The term appears to have been coined by David B. Kopel and Glenn H. 
Reynolds in their article. David B. Kopel & Glenn H. Reynolds, Taking Federalism 
Seriously: Lopez and the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 30 CONN. L. REv. 59, 69 
(1997) ("The second analytic principle that Lopez offers is one this Article calls the 
'non-infinity principle.' In other words, for a Commerce Clause rationale to be accept­
able under Lopez, it must not be a rationale that would allow Congress to legislate on 
everything."); see also Craig M. Bradley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55 
HASTINGS LJ. 573, 589 (2004) ("Because of the non-infinity principle, it would not be 
enough to establish federal jurisdiction to show that a robber, for example, used a gun 
that had traveled in interstate commerce."); Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. 
Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence En­
counters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REv. 1253, 1260 (2003) ("[T]he Court indicated 
that it was serious about enforcing the 'non-infinity principle' in the interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause by looking with a jaundiced eye on any interpretation that would 
effectively convert the Commerce Clause into a general police power."); Craig M. 
Bradley, What Ever Happened to Federalism?, TRIAL, Aug. 2005, at 52, 54 ("[I]f I write 
a note reminding my daughter to take out the garbage, the pencil or the notepad may 
have traveled from another state, so my using them has an 'effect' on interstate com­
merce. . .. The non-infinity principle narrows this focus to a reasonable one."). 
179. See supra text accompanying notes 172-173. 
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lated activity is the key to the constitutionality of legislation under 
the Commerce Clause.180 The Court, both in that case and in Mor­
rison, seemed to take the primary place in determining whether an 
activity was economic. Raich, despite quoting a dictionary for a 
definition of "economic,"181 does nothing to soften this primary 
placement, as the Court there explicitly decided that the CSA regu­
lates economic activity.182 
Somewhat paradoxically, an understanding of this situation al­
lows the conclusions reached so far about Congress's power to reg­
ulate to actually be expanded. That is, by employing the notion that 
the economic nature of an activity is a decisive factor in determin­
ing the constitutionality of a statute, Arbaugh can be read to say 
that the Court is now conceding to Congress not only the power to 
regulate any economic activity, but also the power to define what 
activity is economic (thUS regulable). This is the separation of pow­
ers oriented conclusion referred to above. It can be deduced from 
Arbaugh that Title VII, even without a jurisdictional element, was 
validly passed by Congress under its commerce power. The justifi­
cation for this, consistent with Morrison, Lopez, and Raich, is that 
employment, the activity regulated by Title VII, is economic. But 
the court has not said that employment is an economic activity. In 
order for the statute to be constitutional, someone must have made 
a definitive determination that employment is an economic activity. 
Since the Court has not spoken, that "someone" can only be Con­
gress. Thus, the Court has implicitly stated that it would uphold 
Title VII absent a jurisdictional element on the grounds that Con­
gress believes employment is an economic activity. 
But if that is true of Title VII, there is no principled reason why 
it would not be true of any other statute Congress might wish to 
pass. In other words, Congress, under this reading, need simply 
regulate, and that regulation will serve as a signal to the Court that 
Congress believes that the regulated activity is economic, and thus 
180. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 ("Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its 
terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise ...."). The 
Court has asserted the same type of authority in other contexts. For example, in decid­
ing whether Congress properly abrogated state sovereign immunity through Section 5 
legislation, the Court has examined the history of the statute for evidence that the legis­
lative response to was "congruen[t] and proportional [to] the injury to be prevented or 
remedied." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). The Court believed that 
it had "the responsibility ... , not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional 
guarantees." Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001). 
181. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005). 
182. [d. at 25-26. 
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within the commerce power without a jurisdictional element or any 
other limiting factor. 
That Congress can determine its own jurisdiction under the 
Commerce Clause by simply legislating and regulating anything it 
wants to seems somewhat outrageous. The power that the Court is 
arguably granting to Congress is breathtakingly broad. The strong 
role of the courts, particularly in the Commerce Clause area, will 
have been reduced to nothing. Perhaps, then, a qualifier is due. 
The specter of the innate understanding of employment as an eco­
nomic activity haunts this entire analysis. The conclusion reached 
above, that Congress can regulate anything it pleases under the 
Commerce Clause, has to be tempered by the knowledge that the 
base upon which it rests is, after all, Title VII, a statute regulating 
an activity that is, as noted above, almost indisputably economic. 
Perhaps the Court was comfortable with the consequences of its 
decision precisely because it had an understanding of employment 
as an economic activity, despite a lack of definitive adjudication to 
that effect. In that case, a reexamination of the extreme conclusion 
reached here is due.183 Perhaps Congress, instead of having essen­
tially limitless power, can actually regulate anything that can fairly 
be said to be economic under the Commerce Clause.184 This com­
ports with Arbaugh itself because employment certainly can be 
fairly argued to be economic. It also leaves room for the courts to 
exercise some control over the scope of Congress's commerce 
power, which control they are likely extremely reluctant to abdicate 
completely. 
The key understanding arising from Arbaugh, though, whether 
the conclusion is the original broad one or the more tempered one 
immediately above, remains the same, and is perhaps best ex­
pressed by Justice Ginsburg's words for the Court in the Arbaugh 
opinion: "[W]e think it the sounder course ... to leave the ball in 
Congress' court."185 
183. The desire for a reexamination based on our understanding of employment 
as an economic activity, however, does not change the underlying logic of the analysis. 
That is, whether or not Title VII is the foundation on which the Court built Arbaugh, 
the same chain of reasoning still leads from that decision to the conclusion that Con­
gress can regulate anything under the Commerce Clause. In other words, the argument 
made here is statute-independent. Everything follows from the Court's statement of its 
broadly applicable bright-line rule, not from any inherent properties of Title VII or 
employment. 
184. Nothing rides on the precise form of the language chosen to limit the scope 
of the conclusion. Certainly other phraseology could be equally as appropriate. 
185. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006). 
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CONCLUSION 
Arbaugh, a seemingly innocuous case about a distinction Uuris­
diction versus merits) that is certainly important but hardly world 
changing, turns out to have enormous consequences if its conclu­
sion is followed to its logical ends. Because of the constitutional 
limitations on the power of the federal courts to exercise jurisdic­
tion and the power of the Congress to regulate, stating that the fed­
eral courts do have jurisdiction to hear a dispute is equivalent to 
saying that Congress granted those courts that jurisdiction, which is 
in turn equivalent to saying that Congress has the power to regulate 
in the area of the dispute. 
The Court in Arbaugh read Title VII to mean that the federal 
courts have jurisdiction to hear cases even where the employer has 
fewer than fifteen employees, and also implicitly decided that fed­
eral courts can hear disputes even where the employer has not the 
slightest relation to interstate commerce. Thus, Congress has the 
power to regulate small employers, even those without the slightest 
connection to interstate commerce. Carrying this one step further, 
there is no principled reason to differentiate between employment 
and any other activity given employment's status as an activity that 
has not been adjudicated by the Supreme Court in the post-Lopez 
era to be economic. However, realism and a reminder that employ­
ment is almost certainly an economic activity within the under­
standing of the Supreme Court temper this extreme conclusion, 
leaving in its stead a slightly more limited one: Congress can, pursu­
ant to the logical consequences of Arbaugh, regulate anything that 
can be fairly argued to be economic under the Commerce Clause. 
